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Abstract: We develop a new conceptual framework to analyze the evolution of the relationship
between cultural production and different forms of economic and social value creation in terms
of three alternative socio-technical regimes that have emerged over time. We show how, with the
emergence of the Culture 3.0 regime characterized by novel forms of active cultural participation,
where the distinction between producers and users of cultural and creative contents is increasingly
blurred, new channels of social and economic value creation through cultural participation acquire
increasing importance. We characterize them through an eight-tier classification, and argue on this
basis why cultural policy is going to acquire a central role in the policy design approaches of the
future. Whether Europe will play the role of a strategic leader in this scenario in the context of future
cohesion policies is an open question.
Keywords: culture 1.0–3.0; patronage; cultural and creative industries; cultural participation; cultural
communities of practice; EU cohesion policies
1. Introduction
Culture-led local and regional development has been a policy and media buzz across Europe
and almost elsewhere in the world in the last two decades [1], and there is ample evidence of success
stories, as well as of instructing failures, that provides a basis for an understanding of the structural
and contextual conditions that enable (or block) culture’s capacity to generate social and economic
value [2–4]. Despite this, and especially so in moments of economic stagnation where culture is the
natural target of public budget cuts [5–8], there is a widespread perception that the role and potential
of culture in long-term competitiveness strategies is seriously under-recognized, and this is especially
true for Europe [9].
It is therefore no wonder that culture plays a marginal role in the European cohesion policy and
policy agenda [10], and that the share of public resources for cultural activities and initiatives falls
short of the share of cultural and creative sectors in the total European Union Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), despite the recognized importance of the latter [11]. Culture appeals to European policy makers
for the promotion of social cohesion, but less so as a driver of economic growth [12]. Consequently,
culture occupies a side seat in EU regional Smart Specialization Strategies [13], or becomes a tactical
tool of local consensus building [14].
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How can culture be at the same time a pillar of European identity and an important area of
economic value and jobs creation and a marginal policy target? This apparently puzzling state of
affairs is mainly the consequence of a persisting gap in the conceptualization of the role of culture in an
advanced, knowledge-based economy as is the European one nowadays. Many policymakers outside
the cultural sphere still regard the cultural sectors as a low-productivity branch of the economy, relying
upon external subsidies more than autonomously creating economic value. As a consequence of this
wrong conceptualization, cultural activities are regarded as a center of cost to be put under control,
and pleas from sector stakeholders are perceived as partisan, rent-seeking advocacy.
The issue has a major national and trans-national dimension in the European policy debate.
The relevance of successful case studies of culture-led development of cities and regions depends
on the attitudes of national policymakers rather than local ones, as the latter behave as strategic
followers [15]. Studies on the size and importance of the European cultural and creative sectors [16–18]
raise some momentary attention but fail to enable a stable focus in the EU policymaking agenda
priorities, due to the lack of a proper conceptual model of the role of culture in development processes.
The importance of building a nation-wide awareness of the policy relevance of culture has become
clear, for instance, when in 2013 a 100% cut in the cultural budget of Newcastle, one of the U.K.’s top
success cases of culture-led development [19], although not free of controversy [20], was threatened.
National newspapers covered the story [21], helping to turn the total cancellation into a, however
shocking, 50% cut. Furthermore, even in the U.K. where cultural policy manages to make the headlines
sometimes, the general trend heads toward a massive downsizing of cultural budgets [22]. In other
EU countries, the trends are even worse.
Europe is therefore at risk of lagging behind in a field that elsewhere attracts strategic and policy
attention and economic resources, such as in dynamic, Far-Eastern countries, such as South Korea,
Hong Kong, Singapore and China, or in ambitious, small Middle-Eastern countries such as Qatar and
Abu Dhabi. Also, Europe is not the incumbent leader in the global market for cultural and creative
contents, to the advantage of the United States, due to EU countries’ failure to implement a joint
strategy in the field, which would be a rather formidable task in political terms due to the fact that
several EU countries have carefully developed, and consistently deploy, their own national cultural
strategies [23–26]. Currently, the bigger challengers to the USA are Japan and China, with Germany,
U.K., France, and Italy all following at some distance. Future spending trends suggest a widening
gap, as the Asia-Pacific area consistently outperforms Europe in this regard [27]. As of 2017, among
the top ten countries for market size of their media industries, there were the four larger EU creative
economies (Germany, U.K., France, and Italy, in this rank order), but their combined size totaled
slightly more than half of the USA market size [28]. Moreover, Japan and China as the second and third
countries for market size both vastly outperformed EU’s largest creative economy, namely Germany,
whose size amounted to slightly more than half of Japan’s or China’s. Finally, the combined market
size of the three Far-Eastern countries in the top ten (Japan, China, South Korea, in this rank order,
with Japan and China basically equivalent in size) again substantially outperformed that of the four
top European creative economies (the combined size of the former being 34% bigger than that of the
latter). Therefore, not only Europe’s combined top creative economies cannot stand the comparison
with that of the USA, but they are not even the closer geo-economic competitor, having been replaced
in this respect by the combined top Far-Eastern creative economies. Also, new global players, such as
Brazil and Canada, also made the top list (as well as South Korea itself, whose market size already
outperforms that of both Canada and Italy), signaling an ongoing globalization of the cultural and
creative arena, a trend likely to further consolidate as more emerging, densely populated countries,
such as India, Mexico, or Turkey, are increasing both their production and investment focus and their
consumption spending in the field.
This latter intuition is reinforced at the urban geographical scale (see Table 1), looking at the
top fifteen global cities for entertainment and media spending in 2009, 2014, and the projection for
2018 [29]. In the future, non-European mega-cities will likely have a growing impact on the global
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cultural and creative economy, exposing Europe to further competitive pressure. However, as it can
be clearly seen by the trends highlighted in Table 1, European cities, with the exception of London,
are already losing positions in the global ranking, with Madrid disappearing from the top fifteen in
the 2010s and Berlin and Paris steadily sliding toward the bottom of the ranking. It can be expected
that in the next decade, London could be the only European city left in the list.
Table 1. Top 15 global cities for entertainment and media spending, in billion $US. Source: [29].
2009 2014 2018
Tokyo 17.6 New York 19.7 New York 23.6
New York 15.8 Tokyo 19.5 Tokyo 20.1
London 13.9 London 16.3 London 18.5
Seoul 8.6 Seoul 11.9 Seoul 13.5
Sydney 7.1 Hong Kong 9.1 Hong Kong 11.2
Los Angeles 6.9 Los Angeles 8.3 Los Angeles 9.9
Hong Kong 5.9 Sydney 8 Sydney 8.9
Chicago 4.7 Chicago 5.7 Singapore 6.7
Berlin 4.3 Singapore 5.4 Moscow 6.7
Singapore 4.1 Berlin 4.8 Chicago 6.5
Paris 3.8 Moscow 4.8 São Paulo 5.4
Moscow 3.2 Paris 4.4 Berlin 5.1
Toronto 3.2 Toronto 4.1 Toronto 5.0
Madrid 2.4 São Paulo 3.7 Paris 4.9
São Paulo 2.2 Shanghai 3.2 Shanghai 4.9
The picture that emerges therefore puts Europe under pressure in terms of its future relevance
in the global cultural and creative contents arena, and all the more if major EU countries fail to
coordinate strategically under a common EU platform. Fragmentation (and small population size)
leaves EU countries below the critical size needed to achieve a leading global player status, and this
even applies to Germany and the U.K., despite London’s role as a global media and content capital,
closely connected to its financial capital role (but with the pending uncertainty about the consequences
of Brexit [30]).
The present paper offers some preliminary reflections in this respect by introducing a new
conceptual framework for the understanding of the contribution of culture to economic and social
value creation in terms of three different socio-technical regimes that have emerged over time.
Such framework provides a basis for a rethinking of the role of cultural policies in future European
cohesion and competitiveness strategies. Our framework also helps to explain why the contribution of
culture to social and economic development tends to be overlooked by policymakers, and with what
consequences. The logical scope of our framework is in principle not confined to Europe, but reflecting
upon the European scenario is particularly useful in the light of the central role of Europe in the
development of the cultural production regimes, which are the conceptual pillars of our reasoning.
2. Three (Complementary) Socio-Technical Regimes of Value Production: From Culture 1.0 to
Culture 3.0
The misconceptions about the role of culture in the contemporary economic context can be traced
back to the persistence of obsolete conceptualizations of the relationship between cultural activity and
the generation of economic (and social) value added. To illustrate this point, we need to sketch out a
basic, inevitably crude, account of the evolution of the relationship between the two spheres.
The emergence of a structured model of relationship between cultural production and the
socio-economic context is intertwined with the construction of human relational structures and with
the development of human cognition [31]. The socially embedded nature of cultural and artistic
production in a grassroots regime has largely done without, for a long phase of human history,
the social recognition of culture as an autonomous, socially legitimized sphere of activity, even
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in already advanced socio-economies, such as those of the Ancient Empires where the arts were
flourishing, but were also mainly instrumental to the celebration of political and religious power.
Cultural production abilities had a prominent role in many spheres of the Ancient Empires social
and economic life, from court entertainment to crafts [32], but the only meaningful identity to be
recognized, celebrated, and transmitted in relation to them was that of the King itself, with the artist
remaining a humble, anonymous presence. The identity and social role of the artist are gradually
defined in classical Greece [33], and find their full-fledged formulation with the patronage model of
Imperial Rome [34].
For centuries, artistic and cultural production as a clearly identified, socially legitimized sphere
of activity has been structured by what we could call the Culture 1.0 regime, founded upon the
concept of patronage, which is at the root of the first, and most ancient, socio-technical regime of value
production through culture. Culture 1.0 is typical of a pre-industrial economy, where culture is neither
a proper economic sector, nor it is accessible to the majority of potential audiences. The provision
of culture is secured by the individual initiative of patrons. In its classical form, patronage is the
province of individuals with considerable financial possibilities and social status, who derived them
from sources other than cultural commissioning, but decided to employ some to secure to cultural
producers the material means to make a living in exchange for the enjoyment of the outcome of
creative production to be shared with their acquaintances. Patronizing culture may substantially
enhance the patron’s social image and reputation, and assume a sophisticated strategic character,
like in Middle Age and, even more, Renaissance patronage [35,36]. However, as the resources are
generated outside the cultural sphere, cultural production here lives on external subsidies, and could
not survive otherwise. In the patronage relationship, moreover, the wage of cultural producers is not
truly part of a market transaction, but rather of a symbolic, mutual exchange of gifts between the
patron and the artist [37], a practice that still survives in some cultural realms [38], and finds intriguing
developments in new, culturally-mediated social platforms [39]. However, this model can support
only a limited number of cultural producers who entirely depend upon the discretion of the patron
and limited audiences. Both production of, and access to, culture are therefore severely limited by
economic and social barriers.
With the massive social changes associated with the industrial (economic) revolution and with the
concurrent bourgeois (political) revolutions that led to the birth of the modern nation states, we witness
a widening of cultural audiences, made possible by a few concurrent circumstances [40]. First, with
the bourgeois revolutions questioning the privileges of the ruling classes, access to culture is gradually
legitimized as a universal right that is part of the very idea of citizenship [41]. Second, with the steady
improvement of the living conditions of the working classes, there is a corresponding increase in the
willingness to pay for cultural entertainment [42]. Access to cultural goods and opportunities, however,
remains limited until the outbreak of the “cultural” industrial revolution in the decades around the
turn of the 20th century, which creates the technological conditions for the full emergence of cultural
mass markets [42]. Meanwhile, the modern nation states had concurrently been developing new forms
of “public patronage,” allocating public resources to support culture and the arts for the social benefit.
Therefore, we can finally speak of cultural public policies, and of the corresponding cultural policy
models [43], which articulate public initiative in the cultural field in a variety of country-specific forms:
“facilitator,” “patron,” “architect,” “engineer,” “elite nurturer,” etc. [44], allowing for considerable local
diversity in terms of mission, organization, design, and effectiveness.
The current notion of cultural public policy is still rooted in the Culture 1.0 (pre-industrial) regime,
however evolved, although the debate on its role and scope in industrially advanced societies has a long,
complex history [45]. The patronizing role is no longer exclusively in the hands of single individuals
(even when they incarnate political institutions, as for Renaissance Princes or modern Kings),
but becomes a public function, although in ways and forms that are sensitive to the socio-economic
history of European nation-states [46]. Culture, however, is still economically un-productive, absorbing
resources generated in other sectors of the economy. With the “cultural” industrial revolution around
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the turn of the 20th century, however, the technological possibility of cultural mass markets becomes
real, through the introduction of modern rotary printing, photography and cinema, recorded music,
and radio broadcasting [47]. The portfolio of cultural products dramatically expands, while being
made available to much wider audiences, at increasingly affordable prices, and by means of new,
tailor-made business models and strategies [48]. The transition to the Culture 2.0 regime is now
possible, that is, the second socio-technical regime of value creation through culture finally emerges.
In the Culture 2.0 regime, audiences expand significantly, whereas cultural production is still
severely controlled by entrance barriers as the access to productive technologies is difficult and
financially expensive, such that would-be cultural producers are filtered by complex selection systems
that differ across cultural sectors. Culture 2.0 is a new form of relationship between cultural production
and the generation of economic value, dominated by the expansion of the cultural and creative
industries [49]. Unlike Culture 1.0, in Culture 2.0 there are cultural and creative activities that produce
economic value and become profitable, but they are a branch of a specific, minor sector of the economy
if compared to the main manufacturing ones: the entertainment industry.
The idea of cultural mass production that became possible in the Culture 2.0 regime was far
from universally welcomed in Europe [50], as it represented a direct challenge to the existing systems
of control of cultural production, and of legitimization by the gatekeepers of publicly patronized
resources [51]. From the European perspective of the time, cultural mass production could be regarded
as a tool of mass manipulation [52]. However, in the USA, such concerns were less relevant due to the
lack of an idealized, anti-commercial notion of culture nurtured by centuries of patronage and strategic
gatekeeping by cultural elites. Quite to the contrary, the need to build up a compelling national
narrative for the new global power found in the nascent cultural industry the ideal platform [53].
The enthusiastic adoption of the cultural industry in its heroic phase in the USA marks a departure
from European culture, its intimidating highbrow rituals, and its defense of a paternalistic, publicly
funded and monitored governance of cultural production.
The undisputed leadership of the USA on the cultural industry of the 20th century is a consequence
of this crucial passage: the demise of market-oriented cultural production in Europe [54], despite
that most of the technological innovations behind the cultural industry revolution were developed
there, and despite its so far undisputed global leadership in the cultural sphere (a consequence of
the 19th century colonial rule). The uncontested development of a mass-oriented cultural industry
in the USA enabled the latter to seize the opportunity set forth by the rapid global growth of mass
cultural markets, and to transform Europe itself in an export market for its own cultural content [55].
In Europe, cultural and creative industries flourished in all major fields—publishing, music, cinema,
radio-television, design, fashion, and communication—but their relationship with the non-industrial
fields of the cultural core [56], the ones that identify more with the European cultural tradition (visual
arts, performing arts, and heritage) remained problematic. Moreover, the success parameters for
European cultural industry are less directly identified with market performance with respect to the
USA: gatekeepers approval and cultural stigma still play a major role, and for cultural producers
“excessive” market success and recognition may be regarded by peers as a sign of capitulation of
artistic excellence to the lure of “commercial” culture.
Only recently has Europe fully acknowledged the developmental potential of the cultural and
creative industry [57], but the gap opened by decades of cautious suspicion as opposed to the pervasive
U.S. control of the global market through decades of consistent strategies and investments cannot
realistically be closed [58]. This recent (re-)discovery of the economic potential of cultural and creative
industries in Europe, with creative industries gaining central importance for their connection to the
tradition of historical European manufacture, may be seen as a mature development of the Culture 2.0
regime [59]. Public policies now increasingly focus upon audience development, but also upon
entrepreneurial development in the cultural and creative sectors, due to a growing recognition of their
economic impact [60]. However, Europe now faces the risk of overreaction from late adoption,
excessively focusing upon the profitability of single sectors, and concentrating support toward
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the best-performing production segments only, threatening the viability of the whole industry by
disregarding the complex ecological relationships that tie the sectors together [61].
Designing appropriate policies for the cultural industries is a particularly difficult task in view
of their specificities, and of the peculiarities of their entrepreneurial cultures, that in Europe have
developed relatively late, and with difficulty [62]. To understand the industrial organization logic of
cultural and creative sectors, standard economizing models of profit maximizing and instrumental
rationality are partially misleading [63]. In the cultural and creative sphere, expressive rationality,
intrinsic motivation, and social exchange are essential aspects, often leading to forms of interaction
that are not mediated by markets [64]. Moreover, the global financial crisis, that since 2008 has
severely hit Europe, has negatively influenced Europe’s capacity to support its cultural and creative
industries at the scale that would be required by global competition [65], and especially so in view
of the huge investments carried out by emerging global leaders such as China [66]. If this can be
seen as a limitation, it also paved the way to new forms of experimentation in cultural production,
that rather than pushing the industrial dimension, have focused upon community involvement and
upon bottom-up participation. This turn reflects the emergence of a yet another regime of cultural
production where Europe can play a true leadership role if it is ready enough to acknowledge its
potential and to embrace it consistently: despite the short-lived history of Culture 2.0, a new wave of
social and technological innovation is already mounting and preparing the emergence of yet another
socio-technical regime of value creation that we call Culture 3.0 and which is still in its early stage.
Culture 3.0 is characterized by a wave of social and technical innovations that, unlike Culture 2.0
at the turn of the 20th century, is no longer focused upon expanding the demand (audience) side,
but is driven by a structural transformation of the production side. The technologies behind the birth
of the cultural industry (radio, television, cinema, photography, recorded music, industrial printing)
are all centered upon the massive, and cheap, reproduction of content. They make access to cultural
content easier and affordable. The new wave of innovation, instead, is making the production of
content easy and affordable [67]. Today, digital gear for professional treatment of text, still and moving
images, sound, and multimedia is available to everyone, easy to learn, cheap, and undemanding in
terms of physical equipment, something that would have been unthinkable two decades ago [68].
Thus, if the Culture 2.0 “revolution” has been characterized by an explosion of the size of cultural
markets, the Culture 3.0 “revolution” is characterized by the explosion of the pool of producers,
making it increasingly difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between cultural producers and
users themselves [69]. Producers and users are now interchanging roles in a spectrum of possibilities
where access to contents produced by others, and circulation of own content to others, are naturally
juxtaposed and generally occur through the same platforms [70].
In this new scenario, the role of cultural markets as distributional channels is challenged by the
diffusion and expansion of digital platforms where communities of practice self-organize around
production and sharing of content, and where members interact through non-market-mediated
exchanges, a new possibility in-built in the architecture of digital online platforms, which still
leaves ample space for free appropriation by profit-oriented platform providers [71]. The hallmark of
the Culture 3.0 regime is the transformation of audiences (the target reference of cultural industry)
into practitioners (with its consequently entangled notion of authorship and intellectual property).
Access to cultural content loses its traditional passive, appreciative character and becomes a form of
creative appropriation by users [72]. Access stimulates individuals to acquire skills to appropriate and
manipulate cultural contents in personal ways [73]. Rather than just listening to stories, there is an urge
to participate in the narration, to negotiate the unfolding of the story, and likewise for any other form of
cultural production. Also, cultural content production and dissemination becomes socially pervasive
and ceases to be confined in the entertainment sphere, to become part of the texture of everyday life,
as reflected by consumption practices [74]. It is also important to stress how the notion of participation
implied by Culture 3.0 cannot be subsumed into the more familiar notion of prosumerism [75], where
bottom-up production of content tends to be market-mediated, whereas in Culture 3.0 the mediation
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of the market is not an essential element of participation. For this reason, prosumerism is more typical
of an advanced stage of the Culture 2.0 regime than of the Culture 3.0 one [76,77]. However, in this
transitional phase in which mature Culture 2.0 forms and early Culture 3.0 ones coexist and interact,
it is not uncommon to observe hybrid situations in which elements of prosumerism and of active
cultural participation mingle in a variety of ways [73,78]. In fact, the notion of prosumerism has
also been used, in the absence of a full-fledged alternative paradigm, to categorize what would more
properly be seen as a form of plain active cultural participation [79].
Culture 3.0 irreversibly transforms what previously was a separate macro-sector of the economy,
the cultural and creative industry, into a web of layered, pervasive structural relations among all
sectors of the economy and society. Its understanding requires a sophisticated, systemic representation
of the structural interdependencies between the cultural and creative fields, which are already
mutually interdependent, and the other spheres. This change of perspective has especially important
consequences for a strategically effective approach to policy design.
3. The Strategic Importance of Active Cultural Participation
A signal of a widely-felt need to expand the traditional Culture 2.0 focus on the sectorial growth of
cultural and creative industries in new directions is the increasing attention paid to the effects of cultural
and creative production in terms of positive creative spillovers toward other sectors [80]. Arguments
about the spillover effects of culture and creativity have been so far rather un-systematic, without
a well-defined conceptual background, often failing to make a convincing case for policymakers.
Reasoning in terms of the Culture 2.0–3.0 transition may help elucidating why and how cultural
spillovers matter for the general economy.
The key point is shifting the focus from the economic outcomes of cultural activity to the behaviors
that cause them. To understand the effects of culture outside of the cultural sphere, we should
consider how cultural access changes the behavior of individuals and groups [81], fostering active
cultural participation, the cornerstone of the Culture 3.0 regime. The active character of cultural
participation goes beyond the passive absorption of cultural stimuli, motivating individuals to make
use of their skills to contribute to the process: not simply hearing music, but playing; not simply
reading texts, but writing, and so on. By doing so, individuals challenge themselves to expand
their capacity of expression, to re-negotiate their expectations and beliefs, to reshape their own
social identity. We can consider this behavioral dynamic as a knowledge-intensive form of the
capability building process highlighted by Amartya Sen [82], supplemented by research insights on
the vocational socio-psychological dimension of learning [83]. Clearly, capability building is already
enabled, and significantly so, in the passive cultural access mode that is typical of Culture 1.0 and 2.0,
but the active component added by Culture 3.0 makes it more deeply ingrained into individual
motivational systems and social attitudes, and helps re-contextualize the importance of cultural access
beyond the leisure-entertainment sphere, as a pillar of everyday practices in all areas of human activity.
As already emphasized, capability building and skills acquisition is not merely an individual activity,
but a highly social one, and crucially depends upon the social environment [84]. Moreover, in social
contexts marked by strong social incentives toward active cultural participation, individuals are more
likely to be interested in active socio-political participation, and vice versa.
The Culture 3.0 regime also entails an alternative approach to the financial sustainability of
cultural production and participation. Whereas in Culture 1.0, such sustainability is ensured by the
patron’s provision, be it in terms of personal funds or of public resources, such as in the case of
public patronage, and whereas in Culture 2.0 it is rather ensured by the spending capacity of the
audience that purchases cultural and creative products on the market, in Culture 3.0, we witness the
emergence of new forms of financing that leverage upon the community structure itself, as in the case
of crowdfunding schemes [85–87]. One should not, however, consider crowdfunding in its currently
explored forms as the final and characteristic forms of financial sustainability of the Culture 3.0 regime,
as it is likely that this and other forms will further develop in the near future. The Culture 3.0 regime is
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in its early phase, and therefore we need to eschew the temptation of crystallizing its current features
as mature expressions of such a regime. The next few years will certainly provide rich material for
further analysis and conceptualization in this vein as well as in many others.
One thing that can be stated with confidence, however, is the increasing future emphasis on active
cultural participation in its many forms and meanings. Through active participation, individuals are
not simply exposed to cultural experiences, but are encouraged to explore and customize the rules
that generate them; they learn to experiment with the “source code” that is behind the generation
of cultural meaning. Active participation, on the other hand, fosters interest and curiosity toward
exploring cultural expressions from others: a classical virtuous social circle of capability building,
human development, and social cohesion. In the Culture 3.0 context, individuals organize their cultural
interests as intermittent runs of expression and reception, i.e., moments in which they are active and
“transmitting” and moments in which they are passive and “receiving,” as equally necessary aspects
of cultural participation. The acquisition of cultural skills motivates them to develop capacity for
expression, raises the level of attention, critical filters toward received contents, prompts further
willingness to transmit new contents, and so on, paving the way to new forms of open innovation and
co-creation [88], to more constructive uses of social media platforms [89], to new knowledge-intensive
and experience-intensive socio-economic practices [90], etc., a social efflorescence of which we are
currently witnessing just the early developmental steps.
Some of the positive systemic effects of cultural access can also be generated within a traditional
mode of passive reception, e.g., within the passive audience mode, but by confining ourselves into this
(obsolete) perspective, we are unable to appreciate the ongoing process, but only some details. There
are at least eight different areas where cultural participation can cause significant macroeconomic
effects that are not limited to the direct economic impact of the cultural and creative industries on
GDP and jobs, and which can benefit in turn from strategic complementarities with the cultural and
creative sectors. We briefly survey them in the next section. As we will see, they provide the basis for
an innovative rethinking of the aims and scope of cultural policies in a Culture 3.0 regime.
On the other hand, not all forms of cultural access have an unambiguously positive effect.
There is ample evidence that digitally-mediated access to content can be a source of a vast range
of pathologies and behavioral disorders, such as internet addiction [91], sedentary behaviors and
obesity associated to excessive screen time [92], sleep [93] and attention [94] disorders, depression and
social phobia [95], and so on. Likewise, digital access and participation have caused the emergence
of a whole range of new social issues or of the amplification of old issues at a new, unprecedented
scale. Examples abound, such as fake news and news manipulation and the consequent crisis of
social “objectivity” [96], online bullying and shaming of people with different opinions and views [97],
and the diffusion of pseudoscience [98] and conspiracy [99] theories. Digital media are clearly not the
only ones that can provoke such negative effects, as shown, for instance, by the large literature on
TV-related disturbances [100,101]. Equally serious concerns might be raised by future digital platforms
and environments such as immersive virtual and augmented reality and/or artificial intelligence. As a
matter of fact, however, all new cultural media have raised concerns and sparked fears at the time
of their introduction and diffusion. What is needed is a balanced assessment of the potential and
threats, and a careful design, testing and implementation of targeted therapeutic approaches [102] and
capability building strategies [103], in the context of a comprehensive public health strategy to prevent
and minimize negative effects and to enable people and communities to successfully adapt to the new
scenario. This is what the human kind has always done when facing challenging environments [104],
and adaptation to increasingly complex digital environments is no exception in this regard.
4. The Power of Cultural Participation: A 8-Tiers Approach
A detailed discussion of the theoretical foundations of the structural interdependencies that
we present in this section is outside the scope of the present paper, which aims at sketching a first,
raw picture of the social and economic impacts of cultural participation as the key driver of the Culture
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3.0 socio-technical regime of value creation. The reader will find more detailed accounts, analysis,
and data in the provided references. The eight tiers that we present and discuss in this paper have
been chosen as the ones for which research activity, policy design and practice (or at least conceptual
development) are significant enough to warrant their inclusion in a first list of areas of interest to assess
the potential social and economic impacts of cultural participation. The list is by no means exhaustive
and it is possible that further areas will add up in the future. For this reason, one should regard this
analysis as a first exploration.
Thinking of the spillover effects of culture, a first area which has been the object of exploration is
innovation, not simply within the cultural and creative sectors, but in the economy as a whole [105],
and there is an interesting literature that sheds some light upon this important functional link [106].
Here, the effect of active cultural participation may be especially appreciated. Direct involvement in,
and active experience of the rules of, creative content production enables individuals to learn how
innovative meanings and practices can be constructed, and how they can challenge and de-structure
previous beliefs, prejudices, and attitudes [107]. The more such activity is socially pervasive, the more
the socio-cognitive effects of cultural participation upon attitudes toward innovation and change
become relevant and visible. As argued by Phelps [108], massive bottom-up capability building is the
most effective route to the creation of an innovation-driven economy and society. As innovativeness
has not simply to do with research and development (R&D) labs distilling new ideas, but with
the deployment of effective social transmission, translation, and implementation of new ideas into
business practices through the cooperation of a myriad of social and economic actors (one may then
speak of “innovation systems” [109–111]), it is impossible to dismiss the importance of achieving and
strengthening a favorable societal orientation toward innovation. Likewise, the implications of the
latter in terms of enhancement of several dimensions of competitiveness are widely agreed upon.
Through its (still underrated) impact upon orientations toward innovation, active cultural participation
might bring about indirect macroeconomic impacts, which could in principle measure up to the direct
economic turnover of the cultural and creative macro-sector, although an appropriate measurement
approach in this field has not been fully developed yet.
Cultural participation may then be thought of as a driver of endogenous economic
growth [112,113] in ways that are complementary to the extensively studied education-driven ones.
Despite supporting evidence is still fragmentary, mainly due to lack of specific research, it may be
interesting to consider a comparison between the rankings of EU countries in terms of their innovative
capacity measured by the 2017 European Innovation Scoreboard metric [114], and of the Index of
Cultural Practice as measured by the Eurobarometer [115] survey, the latest available source for this
indicator. Each ranking has been divided into three performance classes (top, average, and bottom).
For innovation, the top performance class corresponds to innovation leaders plus strong innovators
according to the Innovation Scoreboard classification; the average class to moderate innovators, and the
bottom class to modest innovators according to the same classification. For culture, the top performance
class corresponds to countries whose combined amount of very high plus high percentage levels of
cultural practice totals 20 or higher; the average performance class to countries whose corresponding
combined percentage lies between 10 and 20, and the bottom performance class to countries whose
corresponding combined percentage lies below 10. The following classification of EU countries then
emerges (Table 2).
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Table 2. EU 28 performance classes in cultural practice and innovation. Source: [114,115].
Top performance in both innovation and
cultural practice
Sweden
Denmark
The Netherlands
U.K.
Luxembourg
Finland
Slovenia
Top performance in innovation and average
performance in cultural practice
Germany
Belgium
Austria
Ireland
France
Top performance in cultural practice and average
performance in innovation
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
Average performance in both innovation and
cultural practice
Spain
Malta
Czech Republic
Poland
Slovak Republic
Croatia
Average performance in innovation and bottom
performance in cultural practice
Cyprus
Portugal
Greece
Italy
Hungary
Bottom performance in both innovation and
cultural practice
Bulgaria
Romania
It is interesting to notice how, despite the two indicators apparently measuring completely
different phenomena, there is a clear association among variables, which establishes a distinctive
pattern across EU countries. No top performing country on one dimension is a bottom performer
on the other, and vice versa. Moreover, a clear geographical pattern emerges, with the leading
group consisting of Northern European countries with the addition of Slovenia; the next best group
hosts Central European countries with the addition of Ireland and the three Baltic States; finally,
the other groups in decreasing order of performance consist of different mixes of Mediterranean and
Eastern European countries. Clearly, many intervening factors may be at work here, and no causal
inference can be drawn from such data. Nevertheless, such evidence is in principle compatible with a
possible role of active cultural participation as a stimulator of societal innovation thinking [116,117],
and even more fundamentally, as a social platform of pre-innovation. In this perspective, it would be
interesting to investigate whether the top-performing countries for cultural practice are characterized
by socio-cognitive environments that, as an effect of a sustained, society-wide acquisition of specific
cognitive capabilities through cultural participation, also provide a more favorable context for the
diffusion of innovation, as compared to countries with lower levels of cultural practice. This hypothesis
calls for a substantial amount of future research, and in case it is corroborated, would open a new line
of both scientific and policy design work on the cross effects of cultural and innovation strategies at
the national and regional levels.
A second important link points to the politically critical area of welfare. There is an impressive
amount of evidence that cultural participation may have significant effects on life expectation [118],
but more recent research seems to suggest that the impact is equally significant in terms of self-reported
psychological well-being [119–121]. In particular, it turns out that cultural participation is the second
predictor of psychological well-being after (presence/absence of) major diseases, and in this regard,
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its impact is comparable to that of income, and significantly stronger than that of variables such as
place of residence, age, gender, or occupation. The effect is particularly remarkable for the seriously ill
and the elderly, where psychological well-being gaps between subjects with high versus low cultural
access are huge. Moreover, the effect of social relations on the well-being consequences of cultural
participation is relevant: a given level of cultural participation has a bigger impact on individual
well-being in social contexts with high cultural participation than in low-participation ones [122].
Another relevant channel of positive spillovers from cultural participation might then relate
to cultural welfare. If cultural participation strongly affects the well-being perception of the ill and
the elderly, and provided that welfare treatment costs are a major public finance burden in the EU,
suitable culturally-focused prevention strategies, if causing even a small reduction in the rates of
hospitalization and in the resort to treatment across such categories, could entail significant savings of
public resources. Such savings could be used to fund the program itself and be partially relocated to
other socially valuable uses, while substantially improving quality of life of critically disenfranchised
citizens [123]. Some preliminary evidence in this regard [124] shows how, based on Italian census
data, higher levels of cultural participation have a positive impact on discharge rates from mental
illness treatment. Once again, there is a new area of cultural policy action with potentially significant
macroeconomic effects, and in addition, one that can disclose new kinds of careers and opportunities
for cultural professionals.
A third important link regards sustainability. The increasing emphasis on the social dimensions
of sustainability, as highlighted by Agenda21, has sparked a reflection on whether socially transmitted
behaviors, habits, and customs may influence the effectiveness of resource-saving programs and
strategies. In this respect, however, attention has been mainly devoted to traditional forms of
social mobilization [125]. However, again, cultural participation may have an important indirect
role in fostering social mobilization and awareness about the social consequences of individual
behaviors related to environmentally critical resources. For instance, working on data from the
Italian Multipurpose Survey from Italy’s National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Crociata et al. [126]
have proven that there is a strong association between cultural participation and effectiveness of
differentiated waste recycling. Moreover, the social dynamics of recycling behavior seems to be
sensitive to proximity effects [127,128], so that there can be a potential for combined action of
cultural policies improving cultural participation, and the socio-spatial transmission of pro-social
(environmentally responsible) behaviors. Once again, the likely reason is that the acquisition of
competences and skills from cultural practice may spill over significantly in terms of individual
capacity of successfully classifying and stocking different types of waste, and more generally in
terms of individual awareness of the social value of, and motivation for, embracing environmental
responsibility in everyday choices.
A fourth important link is to social cohesion, also in view of the recognition of culture as the fourth
pillar of sustainable development [129]. There is again ample evidence of how certain types of cultural
projects may be effective for juvenile crime prevention, pro-social vocational orientation, or conflict
resolution [130–132]. We are currently already beyond the exploratory phase in this field, so that some
of the most successful projects are now providing the basis for full-fledged policy approaches, as in the
case of musical education and juvenile orchestras [133]. As far as music is concerned, it has been proven
that joint music-making in early childhood is effective for the promotion of pro-social behavior [134],
and therefore musical education can legitimately be regarded as a pillar of a new generation of social
cohesion strategies. One relevant effect of active cultural participation on social cohesion is in terms of
human development, for instance by driving the self-esteem in subjects of infants and youth at high
social risk of deviance onto a constructive, rather than self-destructive, developmental path. Another,
equally relevant one concerns building a capability basis for intercultural dialogue and exchange [135],
a theme that in Europe’s current socio-political context acquires an unprecedented importance. In this
regard, the indirect effect of cultural participation is creating the basic trust conditions for dialogue
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through appreciation of cultural diversity and the overcoming of negative social stereotyping [136],
often linked to ethnicity factors [137].
There have been strategic approaches to cultural infrastructure building that have explicitly
addressed the social cohesion dimension, as in the case, e.g., of the Maisons Folie network of cultural
facilities created by the Région Nord-Pas de Calais in the context of the Lille 2004 European Capital of
Culture program [138]. The most successful Maisons have become spaces of multi-cultural interaction
and exchange in socially critical areas, facilitating mutual knowledge and acquaintance of people
belonging to different, and often mutually segregated, ethnic communities. The indirect effects of
cultural participation on social cohesion stem from the fact that increased participation provides
individuals and groups with new skills to conceptualize and understand diversity, and to reprogram
their behavior from defensive hostility to communication, while at the same time uncovering new
possibilities for personal development [139]. Looking at the costs of inter-ethnic and inter-cultural
social conflict across Europe, this area qualifies as one of the most promising and urgent in terms of a
reformulation of the cultural policy agenda, and of the corresponding macro-impact.
A fifth link is to new entrepreneurship models. There is a clear perception that the cultural
and creative field may be a powerful incubator of new forms of entrepreneurship [140,141], and the
rapid growth of the online content industries is setting the stage for a new entrepreneurial culture
with a strong generational identification [142]. At the EU level, this scenario is being taken seriously
enough [143], but the development of creative entrepreneurship still lags behind, if compared to
the attention and resources devoted to entrepreneurship development and support in other sectors
of the economy [144]. Making space for a new, successful generation of creative entrepreneurs in
Europe is essential to secure the future competitiveness of European cultural and creative productions,
and to build the premises for a European leadership in the emergent knowledge economy [145].
Moreover, these new forms of entrepreneurship could significantly improve the employability of
graduates from the humanities, whose appeal to employers in more traditional spheres of innovative
entrepreneurship is generally considered weaker than that of quantitative and technology majors [146].
However, innovative culture-related forms of entrepreneurship might prove important in tackling the
new societal challenges of employability and shorter worktimes in the fourth industrial revolution
context, as well as the new, unprecedented issues of designing social environments characterized by
pervasive man–machine interaction [147].
The sixth, further major link is with lifelong learning and the development of a learning society.
The connection between effectiveness of lifelong learning and intelligence, meant as the development
of capacities allowing the successful adaptation to, and the selection and shaping of, the environmental
context, has been well established [148]; again, there is a clear relationship between the evolution
of this form of intelligence and acquired cultural capital [149], an effect that may be regarded as a
consequence of strong evolutionary selection pressures [150]. The association between active cultural
participation and lifelong learning is thus a very natural one, and unlike others, is not particularly
surprising. In fact, one might even think of active cultural participation as a specific form of lifelong
learning [151]. It is however an open point to check whether, and to what extent, there is a strong, stable
association between breadth and effectiveness of lifelong learning programs and (active) cultural access
figures [152]. Research on this topic would be of great interest, not to speak of its implications in terms
of synergies between educational and cultural policies, and of corresponding endogenous growth
mechanisms. As lifelong learning takes a central place in EU long-term strategies [153], it could be of
interest to launch innovative programs that exploit the strategic complementarities between lifelong
learning and cultural communities of practice [154], as experimentations on advanced platforms of
educational services and of cultural and creative production at the same time.
A seventh link is with soft power. Starting from the seminal work of Nye [155], today there is a
strong awareness of the potential of cultural and creative production in contributing to increase the
visibility, reputation, and influence of countries and regions at all levels of international relationships,
from the political to the economic [156], and to the social [157]. The effective deployment of soft power
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may open up new markets to national and local products through the identification and emulation
dynamics which are typical of post-industrial consumption [158], may attract more visitors [159],
talents and investments [160], and may stimulate new, sophisticated strategies of value creation through
branding and marketing tools [161]. The Monocle Institute for Government soft power index [162,163]
reveals how, at the beginning of the current decade, EU countries stably occupy 6–7 among the
10 top positions in the global soft power ranking, but the scenario is rapidly evolving and many
non-European contenders are challenging the historical incumbents such as major European countries,
USA, and Japan; for example, South Korea’s Hallyu [164,165], or Australia [166], Canada [167],
and New Zealand [168]. As with the lifelong learning link, the relationship between soft power
and cultural and creative production (and participation) is so strong and direct that it does not need
extensive justification. What is less mechanical, however, is finding out effective ways of mainstreaming
a country or region’s cultural and creative contents to global cultural and economic platforms [169].
In this field, a primary role is played by national cultural diplomacy networks (British Council, Alliance
Française, Goethe Institut, IFA, etc.). At the EU level, after a long period of neglect of European-focused
forms of soft power [170], there has been a revamping of interest in cultural diplomacy [171], aimed at
repositioning Europe in the emerging scenario of strongly multipolar soft power [172]. This is therefore
another area where investing in cultural production and participation will likely cause relevant indirect
macro-effects on Europe’s competitive potential, visibility, and socio-political influence.
Finally, an eighth link can be traced to local identity. In recent times, considerable emphasis
has been put on the role of new, spectacular cultural facilities in the catering for global visibility of
urban or regional milieux [173], and more generally on the role of culture in re-defining the social and
symbolic foundations of place and of its development [174]. This is probably one of the best understood
indirect macroeconomic effects of cultural production and participation, but it is worth remarking
how such an effect has been often misread as the last version of a commodified economy of mass
spectacle [175]. Quite the contrary, the developmental potential of a culturally-rebuilt local identity
lies in the capacity to stimulate new, inclusive dynamics of the production of cultural content and new
modes of cultural access by the local community [176], as a consequence of the new opportunities
created by the attraction of outside resources, as it has been for instance the case with the already
cited NewcastleGateshead urban renewal strategy [177]. The crucial developmental impact of culture
on local identity is to enable the community to reweave a long-term view of its development, and to
elaborate visions and make choices accordingly. One of the major factors of crisis of contemporary
Europe is the overwhelming influence of very short-term concerns on the public agenda, which paves
the way to populism and instrumental conflictual local narratives [178], also due to oversimplified
approaches to community participation and involvement in local regeneration processes [179]. In this
respect, for instance, serious gaming may become a very practical and useful tool to invite residents
to new forms of active, playful cultural participation allowing them to look at their own local reality
through the eyes of other ethnic groups and/or from a totally different socio-economic perspective
than their familiar one [180], or to be fully engaged in the co-design of public spaces and facilities [181].
In this sphere, the controversy upon the effectiveness and focus of European cohesion policy [182]
makes it particularly evident how necessary it is to pour new energy into the civic foundations of
European societies as a basis to revitalize local identities and to contrast the idea of Europe as a remote
technocracy, not in sync with the lives, concerns and issues of European citizens [183]. Rather than
helping marginal territories to regain confidence and energy, and contrary to stated intentions and
goals, European policy discourses on local identity have de facto been so far unable to counter nostalgic
or self-segregating narratives of ethnicity and particularism [184], as well as vicious circles of local
identity impoverishment and stereotyping, finalized to tourist attraction [185]. A major rethinking
is called for, in terms of responsible re-appropriation of community assets [186]. A new generation
of participatory development projects based upon bottom-up creation of culturally mediated social
capital might be particularly effective in this respect [187–189]. Rather than breaking new ground,
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in this case the role of active cultural participation may be that of refocusing already ongoing programs
and initiatives [190].
5. Conclusions: Culture 3.0 and the Future of Cohesion Policies in Europe
The Culture 3.0 framework presented in this paper is an original theoretical construct that cannot
be found in the previous literature, although it systematizes a vast amount of previous research and
analysis, as discussed above. It should be seen as a conceptual canvas to stimulate future research in a
more and more systematic exploration of the effects of cultural participation on a variety of social and
economic domains whose policy relevance has already been acknowledged, and that could benefit
from such effects to effectively enlarge their own strategic menu. This also amounts to advocating a
bigger role for culture in the policy agenda not in terms of simple advocacy of culture for culture’s sake,
but also in terms of culture’s proven capacity to expand the scope of other, more recognized policy
areas. To assess how grounded such a new form of advocacy really is, we need a substantial amount of
interdisciplinary research, that for some tiers is already well on its way, whereas for others is still to
be properly formulated and translated into a full-fledged research program. The more such research
yields interesting confirmative results on the strength and significance of the links between cultural
participation and the corresponding spheres of social and economic impact, the more relevant the
Culture 3.0 framework will be for future policy design, and vice versa. The output of future research
in this vein will therefore be either a source of support or of limitation of the framework’s scientific
and policy relevance by confirming or questioning its fruitfulness in generating interesting research
hypotheses and providing a basic for effective policy design.
Our eight-tiered classification of the indirect developmental effects of culture finds its full sense
within a Culture 3.0 regime, where active cultural access and participation becomes the social norm
and the natural orientation of knowledge economies and societies. It provides a first list of possible
areas of indirect impact of cultural participation in the creation of social and economic value, but such
a list could even be partial and amenable to further enlargement in the future. This is not to say,
of course, that the direct macroeconomic effect of the growth of cultural and creative industries should
become less relevant in the new context. Quite the contrary, as we have argued, there is a strong
complementarity between direct economic impacts and indirect ones, as they concur to increase
individual participation and access to cultural opportunities, and stimulate further culturally-related
capability building.
The advent of Culture 3.0 lays the premise for a profound rethinking of the sense and scope of
cultural policy in the decades to come. In Culture 1.0, cultural policy is basically the channel for the
implementation of public patronage. In Culture 2.0, it is a tool to improve the financial sustainability
and the market drive in the production of cultural and creative contents. In Culture 3.0, however,
cultural policy becomes much more than a mere sectorial policy and qualifies to be considered as
a major policy pillar for the economy and the society as a whole. In this perspective, the role of
European institutions, such as Europeana [191,192], whose mission is to make European cultural
heritage accessible and usable to all citizens through smart digitalization, and therefore to foster active
cultural participation through a straightforward Culture 3.0 logic, goes much beyond a mere sectoral
dimension and can be regarded as a pilot experiment of a new generation of cultural institutions
that make massive bottom-up participation their main focus. As shown through the eight-tiered
classification, cultural participation opens up new, unprecedented possibilities of economic and social
value creation in so many different spheres that fall outside culture’s conventional domain of action
and impact. Such a new perspective has been explicitly recognized by the New Agenda for Culture of
the European Commission, which explicitly indicates the health, innovation, social cohesion, and soft
power tiers (the latter re-defined in terms of cultural diplomacy) as a key orientation of the EU future
policy, and more generally emphasizes the key strategic role of cultural crossovers as a full-fledged
internalization of what could previously be regarded as spillover (i.e., unintentional and unplanned)
effects into a coherent and cohesive policy design paradigm which purposefully pursues them [193].
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This means, in particular, that culture may cross paths with practically all the major policy themes
of today: from innovation to welfare, from inter-cultural dialogue to sustainability, and many more.
However, if this shift of perspective is not appropriately realized by policymakers, this amounts
to failing to acknowledge a key nexus of the emerging socio-economic organization made possible
by the ubiquitous production of cultural and creative contents. In European programming terms,
this calls for empowering cultural policies with new, key roles in the design and deployment of more
context-specific cohesion strategies [194], and as an innovative platform for smart specialization [195].
Learning to integrate cultural policies into the traditional policy toolbox and finding for them an
appropriate space in the policy agenda priorities are therefore key challenges for the policy making of
both the near and the not-so-near future.
It should also be noted that the Culture 3.0 paradigm is not denying the importance of more
conventional forms of culture-driven development such as, for instance, cultural tourism. It is simply
arguing that it should not be taken as the main driver of regional culture-led development, as it could
be done in a mature Culture 1.0 perspective, but rather as a complementary sector which generates
economic value as a consequence of the main drivers. A culturally thriving milieu can also attract
cultural tourism, but the vice versa is not true, in the sense that large tourist flows without a strong,
lively base of local cultural production quickly transform the milieu into a tourist-dependent theme
park [196]. The best way to create social and economic value through culture is in terms of expressive,
not instrumental rationality. The value of culture is tightly linked to its crucial capacity to produce,
preserve, and transmit meaning generatively, that is, as a self-catalytic process of human flourishing,
capability and skills creation, and equitable development [197].
Will Europe manage to seize the opportunity? The signals are contradictory so far. As we have just
noticed, the Culture 3.0 perspective is finding space in the EU strategic thinking on the role of culture
in future policies. However, having to face the urgencies posed by the many economic and social
criticalities of today, there is a constant risk that the EU marginalizes in practice the role of cultural
policy rather than upgrading it to the new level, and that would be a sign that there is still a significant
gap in terms of strategic vision and conceptual awareness of the revolutionary implications of Culture
3.0. At the moment, it is difficult to anticipate which side will prevail. If the new conception of cultural
policy making will not be able to inform the strategic policy vision for the next 2021–2027 policy
cycle, it seems reasonable to conjecture that a full-fledged cultural participation-driven concept of
cultural policy making will eventually flourish elsewhere, as it already happened with the emergence
of Culture 2.0. Furthermore, there are many interesting candidates in this respect. The future scenario
is open, and the race has already begun.
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